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Abstract—Defense techniques such as Data Execution Preven-
tion (DEP) and Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
were the early role models preventing primitive code injection
and return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks. Notably, these
techniques did so in an elegant and utilitarian manner, keeping
performance and scalability in the forefront, making them one of
the few widely-adopted defense techniques. As code re-use has
evolved in complexity from JIT-ROP, to BROP and data-only
attacks, defense techniques seem to have tunneled on defending
at all costs, losing-their-way in pragmatic defense design. Some
fail to provide comprehensive coverage, being too narrow in scope,
while others provide unrealistic overheads leaving users willing
to take their chances to maintain performance expectations.
We present MARDU, an on-demand system-wide re-
randomization technique that improves re-randomization and
refocuses efforts to simultaneously embrace key characteristics
of defense techniques: security, performance, and scalability. Our
code sharing with diversification is achieved by implementing
reactive and scalable, rather than continuous or one-time
diversification while the use of hardware supported eXecute-only
Memory (XoM) and shadow stack prevent memory disclosure;
entwining and enabling code sharing further minimizes needed
tracking, patching costs, and memory overhead. MARDU’s
evaluation shows performance and scalability to have low
average overhead in both compute-intensive (5.5% on SPEC)
and real-world applications (4.4% on NGINX). With this
design, MARDU demonstrates that strong and scalable security
guarantees are possible to achieve at a practical cost to
encourage deployment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Present day computing continues to trudge through a chal-
lenging jungle of memory corruption vulnerabilities with no
clear endgame in sight. Early in the journey through the
attack landscape jungle, code injection attacks [16], [18], [53]
were subsided with the introduction of simplistic yet effective
techniques like Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [52], [63].
This quickly refocused efforts against stronger adversaries
such as code re-use. Code re-use attacks, like return-oriented
programming (ROP) [74] and ret-into-libc [75], utilize a
victim’s program code against itself. Innocent code snippets,
called gadgets, are repurposed to construct gadget-chains, the
equivalent of a malicious payload and initiated via mem-
ory corruption vulnerabilities. To combat code weaponization
and locating these gadgets in the first place, coarse-grained
ASLR [23], [24], [54], [79], was created to obstruct the base
address of an executable code section while keeping all code
intact. Because of ASLR’s cost-to-benefit ratio and upholding
of code sharing, this pushed for position-independent code
to become the default compilation method for applications to
utilize it.
Finding that coarse-grained ASLR could be bypassed by a
single memory disclosure vulnerability, ASLR moved to fine-
grained randomization via randomizing the executable code
region on the scale of instructions [47], [57], basic blocks [34],
[67], or memory pages [22]. However, instruction displace-
ment [57], as well as in-place code randomization (IPR) [67],
do not have full coverage of all gadgets present, leaving
some gadgets completely exposed. Oxymoron [22] focused
on protecting code pointers replacing all code references with
unique labels and accessing functions via indexing into a
protected table (RaTTle). To note, Oxymoron is one of the few
defenses that is scalable, supporting code sharing and not using
background processes for tracking or patching code pointers.
Even if code was randomized at very fine granularity,
indirect memory disclosures (via stack and heap) could still
be used to reveal code pages during runtime as in just-in-time
return-oriented programming (JIT-ROP), leaving fine-grained
ASLR ineffective. By collecting addresses and repeatedly
exploiting memory disclosure vulnerabilities, JIT-ROP spring
boards the attacker to reveal the entire valid executable code
region. Additionally, Snow et al. [77] presented a JIT-ROP
capable of reading JIT’ed code within an application boundary
and construct ROP gadget chains on the fly. Isomeron [34] was
the only fine-grained ASLR technique capable of preventing
both traditional ROP as well as JIT-ROP, by randomly switch-
ing execution between two versions of program code making
it unpredictable which version will be chosen.
eXecute-only Memory (XoM) was then implemented to
more thoroughly guard memory and restrict access to finding
gadgets. XoM was either “resilient” (e.g., Heisenbyte [78]) via
destructive code reads or “resistant”, completely preventing
reading of the code region as in Readactor [32] by using
Extended Page Tables (EPT). While effective against JIT-
ROP, XoM at that time was in its infancy. Tagging and
virtualizing memory via the use of EPT made any memory
access expensive and hog system resources, leaving fewer
resources for the user. It would not be until recently that XoM
would have hardware support via Intel Memory Protection
Keys (MPK) [50] and similar protection in ARMv7-M [20].
Though code could not be directly read via XoM, it could
still be deduced via inference attacks and de-randomization
techniques. BROP [26] utilized generalized stack crash reading
to de-randomize ASLR and leak enough gadgets to launch a
code reuse attack. Other code inference attacks involve crash-
less reads [38], [44], allocation oracles [66], or zombie gadgets
via shared code reloading [76]. These attacks showed that
randomizing once is simply not sufficient even if protected
under XoM; code remains static thereafter and still vulnerable
to any memory leak.
At this point, attacks became more fierce, intimidating
defense techniques to defend by any means necessary and
get out of the jungle alive. Re-randomization enables code
to become too volatile to reliably craft attacks, rendering any
leaked knowledge or weaponized code stale and incorrect, thus
thwarting attacks. Currently, it is assumed that most attacks are
carried out remotely or require I/O system calls to engage. To
counter this, some works opt to trigger via a time interval,
ideally shorter than the network round-trip latency [29], [37],
[88], while others use known “code re-use relevant” events
such as fork() [61] or I/O system calls [25], [84]. However,
this assumption does not paint the entire picture of the ROP
attack landscape. Defenses that utilize a threshold whether via
time, such as Shuffler [88] and CodeArmor [29], or via leaked-
bytes as in ReRanz [84], are vulnerable to inevitably faster
low-profile attacks as attacks continue to evolve. Therefore
it can be reasoned that using an interval is simply not a
comprehensive metric and that the concept of using a threshold
is a liability.
TASR [25] does not rely on a threshold, expecting attackers
usage of I/O system calls like write(). While they do prevent
remote JIT-ROP that use I/O system calls, TASR cannot pre-
vent memory disclosure within the application boundary [72].
These re-randomization techniques forgo expensive execute-
only memory, and instead pair randomization with protecting
code pointers. Early re-randomization works such as Run-
timeASLR [61] and TASR [25] use mutable code pointer
approaches to ideally perturb a significant amount of live code,
but this comes with an equally significant performance cost
(e.g., 30-50% in TASR [84], [88]) associated with pointer
tracking and patching at re-randomiztion, severely limiting the
effective re-randomization frequency possible.
Immutable code pointer approaches such as CodeArmor,
Shuffler, and ReRanz are much more lightweight in terms
of tracking and patching. Although CodeArmor uses segmen-
tation (e.g., %gs) with offsetting, this technique still allows
for ROP gadgets as well as function pointers to be reached
(e.g., f+o == %gs:f+o, where f is an immutable code pointer
and o is an offset). Trampoline and indirection tables, used
by Shuffler and ReRanz, respectively, constrain this loophole
to only full-function code reuse (e.g., allow only the case of
f+o == f’, where f’ is another function in the trampoline);
completely eliminating full-function code reuse and data-
oriented programming [49] is ongoing research.
Regrettably, no current re-randomization techniques take
into consideration the scalability of their approaches; support
for code sharing has been forgotten, and the prevalence of
multi-core has excused the reliance on per-process background
threads. In short, re-randomization is not as impenetrable
and competitive as initially thought. Current work has shown
that making a secure, practical, and scalable ROP defense
technique is challenging. Even if recent defenses have made
some headway through the jungle, most still lack effective
comprehensiveness in security for the system resource de-
mands they require in return (both CPU and memory); these
factors are prime showstoppers for deployment.
In this paper, we introduce MARDU to refocus defense tech-
nique design, showing that it is possible to embrace the core
fundamentals of performance and scalability, while ensuring
comprehensive security guarantees. MARDU builds on insight
that thresholds like time intervals as in Shuffler and CodeAr-
mor or leaked-data-amount in ReRanz are a security loophole
and a performance shackle in re-randomization; MARDU does
not rely on a threshold whatsoever in its design. This lets
MARDU completely side-step the no-win trade-off between
security and performance. Instead, MARDU borrows the event
trigger design but pairs it with XoM violations. Using XoM,
MARDU provides complete prevention of JIT-ROP protecting
against both variations of remote JIT-ROP as well as local JIT-
ROP, compared to TASR which can only defend against the
former, with almost zero overhead by using Intel MPK XoM.
MARDU also combines XoM with trampolines by covering
them from read access while also completely decoupling the
function entry and the function body in memory; unlike in
CodeArmor, this makes it impossible to infer and obtain ROP
gadgets in the middle of a function from a leaked code pointer.
MARDU keeps performance and scalability at its forefront.
MARDU does not require expensive code pointer tracking
and patching like TASR, nor does MARDU incur significant
overhead from continuous re-randomization triggered by over-
conservative time intervals or benign I/O system calls as in
Shuffler and ReRanz, respectively. Additionally, while TASR
shows a very practical average overhead of 2.1%, it has
been reported by Shuffler [88] and ReRanz [84] that TASR’s
overhead against a more realistic baseline (not using compiler
flag -Og) is closer to 30-50% overhead. Finally, MARDU is
designed to both support code sharing and not require the use
of any additional system resources (e.g., background threads
as used in numerous works [25], [29], [37], [84], [88]) with
the help of Linux kernel memory management and leveraging
its own calling convention. To summarize, this paper makes
the following contributions:
• ROP attack & defense analysis. Our background §II
describes the four prevalent ROP attacks that challenge cur-
rent works, including JIT-ROP, code-inference, low-profile,
and code pointer offsetting attacks. In addition, we describe
the bottom-line security implications for each attack. With
this, we classify and exhibit current state-of-the-art defenses
standings on three fronts: security, performance, and scala-
bility. Our findings show most defenses are not as secure or
as practical as expected against current ROP attack variants.
• MARDU defense framework. We present the design of
MARDU in §IV, a comprehensive ROP defense technique
capable of addressing all currently known ROP attacks.
• Scalability and shared code support. MARDU creates
and uses a new calling convention in order to be able to
both leverage a shadow stack and minimize the overhead of
pointer tracking. This calling convention is also what enables
shared code (e.g., libraries) to be even more secure, able
to be re-randomized by any host process and maintain the
integrity for the rest of the entire system. To the best of our
knowledge, MARDU is the first framework capable of this.
• Evaluation & open source prototype. We implement a
prototype of MARDU based on LLVM and Linux kernel. We
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evaluate and analyze MARDU in §VI with compute-intensive
benchmarks as well as real-world applications. MARDU’s
overhead for compute-intensive benchmarks is 5.5% on
average (geometric mean) and its worst-case overhead is
18.3%. We will open source MARDU for the community to
explore other defense mechanisms and build upon our work.
II. CODE LAYOUT (RE-)RANDOMIZATION
In this section, we present a background on existing code
layout re-randomization techniques. To help understand the
attack and defense arms race, we classify code randomization
techniques into two categories: load-time randomization and
continuous re-randomization.
To start with, we describe two attacks, A1 (JIT-ROP) and A2
(BROP), aimed to defeat load-time code randomization. Next,
we describe how continuous re-randomization techniques defy
A1 and A2 by analyzing design elements of the techniques.
Specifically, we categorize continuous re-randomization tech-
niques by its re-randomization triggering condition (i.e., either
based on the system call history or timing threshold) and the
semantics of storing code pointers (i.e., tracking pointers or
use an indirect, immutable function index). The reason for
focusing on those two categories is that these design elements
greatly affect the security, performance, and scalability of
techniques. Finally, we compare and contrast each technique
regarding three aspects, security, performance, and scalabil-
ity. Particularly for illustrating attack resilience, we present
two attacks, A3 (low-profile JIT-ROP) and A4 (code pointer
offsetting), to which existing re-randomization techniques are
susceptible. Regarding scalability, we report the requirement
of additional CPU usage for re-randomization and whether
shared code layout is possible among multiple processes.
In summary, Table I illustrates the characteristics of each
defense technique by randomization category, attack resilience,
and performance and scalability factors, and we describe these
in detail in the following.
A. Attacks against Load-time Randomization
Load-time code randomization techniques suffer from at-
tacks A1 (JIT-ROP) and A2 (BROP, etc.). In the following,
we describe characteristics of techniques and attacks.
1) Load-time Randomization without XoM: Code layout
randomization techniques so-called coarse-grained ASLR [79]
or fine-grained ASLR [22], [31], [34], [47], [48], [54], [57],
[67], [86], depending on the granularity of layout random-
ization, fall into this category of code layout randomization.
These techniques randomize the code layout only once, usually
when code is loaded into memory. After code is loaded
and shuffled, its layout never changes during the lifetime of
the program. The following attack can defeat the security
guarantee of load-time randomization techniques.
A1: Just-in-time ROP (JIT-ROP). An attacker with arbitrary
memory read capability may launch JIT-ROP [77] by interac-
tively performing memory reads to disclose one code pointer.
This disclosure can be used to then leap frog and further
disclose other addresses to ultimately learn the code contents
in memory. Any load-time code randomization technique that
does not protect code from read access including fine-grained
ASLR techniques is susceptible to this attack.
Security implications: Techniques failing to protect code
from read access allows code-reuse attacks to be launched
regardless of code randomization granularity.
2) Load-time Randomization with XoM: In response to
A1 (JIT-ROP), several research projects protect code from
read access via destructive read memory [78] or execute-
only memory [21], [27], [29], [32], [33], [41], [70], [78],
[87]. Systems with destructive read [78] allow code pointer
leaks to occur, but trigger intended localized code corruption
once a read attempt is made, such that code-reuse attacks
following the read will fail to execute the expected code by the
attacker. Systems with execute-only memory (XoM) [21], [27],
[29], [32], [33], [41], [70], [78], [87] aim to fundamentally
block all read attempts of program code by removing read
permissions from the code area. Applying these techniques
prevent attackers from gaining knowledge about code contents,
and thereby, nullifying A1. However, leaving the code layout
fixed after load-time randomization makes these techniques
susceptible to the following attack.
A2: Blind ROP (BROP) and code inference attacks. Even
with protecting code from read access (i.e., XoM), load-time
randomizations still are susceptible to BROP [26] and/or other
code content inference attacks [69], [76]. Although these
attacks do not read code directly, attackers may accumulate
information about the code contents by conducting probing
on the code many times because code layout will never
change after it is loaded and shuffled. In particular, BROP is
a clone-probing attack that infers code contents via observing
differences in execution behaviors such as timing or program
output. Other attacks [69], [76] defeat destructive code read
defenses [78], [87] by inferring code contents from a small
fraction of a code read and then weaponizing inferred code.
Security implications: Maintaining a fixed layout over
crash-probing or read access to code allows inferring
code contents indirectly, and thereby, attackers can still
learn the code layout and launch code-reuse attacks.
B. Continuous Re-randomization Defeating A1 & A2
In response to A1 (JIT-ROP) and A2 (BROP, etc.), contin-
uous re-randomization techniques [25], [29], [37], [42], [61],
[84], [88] aim to defeat attacks by continuously shuffling code
(and data) layouts at runtime to make information (code or
code addresses) leaks or code probing done before shuffling
useless.
To illustrate the internals of re-randomization techniques
in a nutshell, we describe the core design elements of re-
randomization by categorizing them into two, based on their
design elements: 1) Re-randomization triggering condition and
2) Code pointer semantics.
Re-randomization triggering condition. Existing continuous
re-randomization techniques trigger their randomization based
on the following two conditions.
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Types Defenses
Security Performance Scalability
Gran. A1 A2 A3 A4 Perf. Avg. Worst Code Sharing No Addi. Process
Load-time ASLR
Fine-ASLR [31], [47], [48], [54], [57], [67], [86] Fine × × N/A × X 0.4% 6.4% × X
Oxymoron [22] Coarse × × N/A × X 2.7% 11% X X
Isomeron [34] Fine N/A × 19% 42% × ×
Load-time+XoM
Readactor/Readactor++ [32], [33] Fine × N/A X 8.4% 25% × X
LR 2 [27] Fine × N/A X 6.6% 18% × X
kRˆ X [70] Fine × N/A X 2.32% 12.1% × X
Re-randomization
RuntimeASLR [61] Coarse × N/A × × N/T N/T X X
TASR [25] Coarse × × × 2.1%† 10.1%† × ×
ReRanz [84] Fine × X 5.3% 14.4% × ×
Shuffler [88] Fine × × 14.9% 40% × ×
CodeArmor [29] Coarse × × × 3.2% 55% × ×
Our Approach MARDU Fine X 5.5% 18.3% X X
TABLE I: Classifications of ASLR-based code-reuse defenses. Gray highlighting emphasizes the attack (A1-A4) that largely invalidated each
type of defense. indicates the attack is blocked by the defense. (attack-resistant). × indicates the defense is vulnerable to that attack.
indicates the attack is not blocked but is still mitigated by the defense (attack-resilient). X indicates the defense meets performance/scalability
requirements. × indicates the defense is unable to meet performance/scalability requirements. N/A in the column A3 indicates that the attack
is not applicable to the defense due to lacking of re-randomization, and N/T in the column Performance indicates that either SPEC CPU2006
or perlbench is not tested. Specifically in the column A1, indicates that the defense cannot prevent the JIT-ROP attack within the application
boundary that does not use system calls; in the column A4, × indicates that an attack may reuse both ROP gadgets and entire functions
while indicates that an attack can only reuse entire functions. † Note that in TASR the baseline performance is a binary compiled with
-Og, necessary to correctly track code pointers. Previous work [84], [88] reported performance overhead of TASR using regular optimization
(-O2) binary is ≈30-50%. MARDU provides strong security guarantees with low performance overhead and good system-wide scalability
compared to existing re-randomization approaches.
• Timing: Techniques [29], [88] shuffle the layout periodi-
cally by setting a timing window for layout randomization.
For example, Shuffler [88] triggers re-randomization every
50 msec, and CodeArmor [29] can set re-randomization
period as low as 55 µsec.
• System-call history: Techniques [25], [61], [84] shuffle the
layout based on the history of the program’s previous system
call invocations, e.g., after invoking fork() [61] or when
write() (leak) is followed by read() (exploit) [25], [84].
Code pointer semantics. Existing continuous re-
randomization techniques use the following three different
types of code pointer semantics.
• Code address as code pointer: Code pointers store the
actual addresses. In this case, leaking a code pointer lets
the attacker have knowledge about code address. Therefore,
techniques in this category [25], [42] require tracking of
code pointers (or all pointers) at runtime, which is compu-
tation expensive, to update their values after randomizing
the code (and data) layout. For instance, TASR [25] shows
very high performance overhead (30-50%) especially for I/O-
intensive applications, such as web servers [84], [88].
• Function trampoline address as code pointer: Code
pointers store a function table index [88] or the address of a
function trampoline [84]. This design avoids the expensive
pointer tracking in order to enhance the performance of re-
randomization techniques. Instead of tracking and updating
code pointers, techniques in this category setup a function
table, which stores all function addresses of the program,
and store an index of the table in the code pointer to
refer a function. After re-randomization and re-locating
the code layout, the techniques update only the function
table while all code pointers remain immutable. With this
design, leaking a code pointer will tell the attacker only the
semantics of referring to a function (i.e., function index in
the trampoline) but not about the code layout.
• An offset to the code address as code pointer: Code
pointers store an offset from the (randomized) base address
of the layout. This design is also intended for avoiding
pointer tracking by having an immutable offset from the
random version address for referring to a function, as in
CodeArmor [29]. At re-randomization, updating code layout
only requires updating the random version base address,
and does not require any update of pointers. With this
design, leaking a code pointer will tell the attacker the
offset to select a function no matter how the code layout
is randomized.
C. Attacks against Continuous Re-randomization
Continuous re-randomization techniques suffer from two
attacks (A3 and A4) that we define in this section.
A3: Low-profile JIT-ROP. This is class of attacks does
not trigger re-randomization either by completing the attack
quickly or without requiring I/O system calls. As the trigger
for layout re-randomization, Existing defenses utilize one of
timing [29], [37], [42], [88], amount of transmitted data by
output system calls [84], or I/O system call boundary [25]
as the trigger for layout re-randomization. Therefore attacks
within the application boundary, such as code-reuse attacks
in Javascript engine where both information-leak followed by
control-flow hijacking attack may conclude faster than the re-
randomization timing threshold or not interact with I/O system
call, can bypass these triggering conditions. The code layout
may remain unchanged within the given interval, and thereby,
an attacker may launch JIT-ROP to unchanged code layout.
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Security implications: An attack may be completed
within a defenses pre-defined randomization time interval
or without involving any I/O system call invocation.
In such a case, basing the re-randomization trigger on
timing or system call history allows attackers bypass re-
randomization and launch A1 (JIT-ROP) successfully.
A4: Code pointer offsetting. Even with re-randomization,
techniques might be susceptible to a code pointer offsetting
attack if code pointers are not protected from having arithmetic
operations applied by attackers [25], [29]. An attacker may
trigger a vulnerability to apply arithmetic operations to an
existing code pointer. For example, suppose a code pointer
p points to a function f(), and altering the value of p by
adding an offset o could make p point another code address
p+o. Particularly, in techniques directly using code address [25]
or code offset [29], p+o could be even a ROP gadget in f() if
the attacker knows the gadgets offset o beforehand. Ward et
al. [85] has recently demonstrated that this attack is possible
against TASR.
Security implications: Maintaining a fixed code layout
across re-randomizations and not protecting code pointers
lets attackers perform arithmetic operations over pointers,
allowing launching other ROP gadgets.
III. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We build MARDU based on the following assumptions.
Attacker’s capability:
• Arbitrary read/write. Attackers can perform arbitrary
memory read/write (if the address is readable/writeable) in
a target process by exploiting software vulnerabilities in the
victim program. With this capability, attackers may launch
attacks A1–A4 on an unprotected system.
• Local brute-force attacks. We assume that all attack
attempts are run in a local machine. In this regard, attacks
may be performed any number of times within a short time
period (e.g., within a millisecond). This assumption gives the
capability of launching attacks A1–A4 without triggering re-
randomization in prior systems [25], [29], [42], [84], [88].
System and trusted computing base:
• XoM (R⊕X) and DEP (W⊕X). We assume that the
userspace of the system does not have any memory region
that is both readable and executable. Likewise, we assume
that the userspace of the system does not have any memory
region that is both writable and executable.
• Trusted hardware and no physical access. We assume
all hardware is trusted and attackers do not have physical
access. Particularly, we trust Intel Memory Protection Keys
(MPK) [50], a mechanism that provides eXecute-Only Mem-
ory (XoM), and we regard attacks to CPU (side-channel
attacks, e.g., Spectre [55], Meltdown [59]) to be out of
scope.
• Trusted kernel and program loading. We trust the
OS kernel and the loading/linking process of the program
(execve(), ld-linux, etc.), thus attackers cannot intervene
to perform any attack before the program starts.
IV. MARDU DESIGN
We begin by the design overview of MARDU (§IV-A) and
then detail MARDU compiler (§IV-B) and kernel (§IV-C).
A. Overview
This section presents the overview of MARDU, along with
its design goals, challenges, and outlines its architecture.
1) Goals: Understanding how the attack landscape and
existing mitigations fit together, our goal in designing MARDU
is to shore up the current state-of-the-art to enable a practical
code randomization. More specifically, our design goals are as
follows:
Security. No prior solutions provide a comprehensive defense
against existing attacks (see §II). Systems with only load-
time ASLR are susceptible to leaking code-content (A1) and
letting attackers infer code-content (A2). Systems applying
re-randomization are still susceptible to low-profile attacks
(A3) and code pointer offsetting attacks (A4). MARDU aims
at either defeating or significantly limiting the capability of
attackers in launching code-reuse attacks spanning from A1
to A4 to provide best-effort security against existing attacks.
Performance. Many prior approaches [29], [32], [33], [88]
demonstrate decent runtime performance in average cases (<
10 %, e.g., < 3.2 % in CodeArmor); however, they also show
evidence of a few scenarios that are remarkably slow (i.e., >
55 %, see listed numbers in Worst column in Table I). We
design MARDU to run with an acceptable average overhead
(≈ 5 %) with minimal performance outliers across a variety
of application types.
Scalability. Most proposed exploit mitigation mechanisms
have overlooked the impact of required additional system
resources, such as memory or CPU usage, which we consider a
scalability factor. This is crucial for applying a defense system-
wide, and is even more critical when deploying the defense
in the pay-as-you-go pricing Cloud. Oxymoron [22] is the
only defense that allows code sharing of randomized code. No
advanced re-randomization defenses support code sharing thus
they require significantly more memory. Additionally, most
re-randomization defenses [29], [84], [88] require per-process
background threads, which not only cause additional CPU
usage but also contention with the application process. As
a result, approaches requiring per-process/thread background
threads show significant performance overhead as the number
of processes increases. For example, Shuffler [88] shows
around 55% performance overhead when four NGINX workers
(plus four Shuffler threads) run on two cores with 50 ms
shuffling interval.
Therefore, to apply MARDU system-wide, we design
MARDU to not require significant additional system resources,
for instance, additional processes/threads or significant addi-
tional memory.
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Fig. 1: Overview of MARDU
2) Challenges: It is challenging to achieve all of aforemen-
tioned goals. One naive approach is to mix all good defenses
from existing approaches but such an approach fails to meet
the goal because requirements for enabling each defense could
conflict. Hence, we list challenges in achieving our goals in
the following.
Tradeoffs in security, performance, and scalability. An
example of the tradeoff between security and performance
is having fine-grain ASLR with re-randomization. Although
such an approach can defeat A4, systems cannot apply such
protection because the re-randomization must finish quickly to
meet the performance goal and also defeat A3. An example
of the tradeoff between scalability and performance is having
a dedicated process/thread for performing re-randomization.
However, this results in a drawback in scalability by requiring
more CPU time in the entire system. Therefore, a good design
must find a breakthrough to meet all of aforementioned goals.
Conflict in code-diversification vs. code-sharing. Layout
re-randomization requires diversification of code layout per
process, and this affects the availability of code-sharing. The
status quo is that code sharing cannot be applied to any
existing re-randomization approaches, and this makes the
defense unable to scale to protect many-process applications.
Although Oxymoron [22] enables both diversification and
sharing of code, it does not consider re-randomization, nor
use a sufficient randomization granularity (page-level), which
is insufficient against A4.
3) Architecture: We design MARDU to make a break-
through beyond tradeoffs in security, performance, and scal-
ability, which satisfies all three aspects and becomes practical.
We introduce our approach for each aspect below:
Scalability: Sharing randomized code. MARDU manages
the cache of randomized code in the kernel, which is capable
of being mapped to multiple userspace processes and is
not readable from userspace. Thus, it does not require any
additional memory.
Scalability: System-wide re-randomization. Since code is
shared between processes in MARDU, per process random-
ization, which is CPU intensive, is not required; rather a
single process randomization is sufficient for the entire system.
For example, once a worker process of NGNIX web server
crashes, it re-randomizes all its mapped executables (e.g.,
libc.so) upon exit. This re-randomizes all processes using
the same executables (e.g., libc.so of all processes, including
other workers of the NGNIX server, will be immediately re-
randomized).
Scalability: On-demand re-randomization. MARDU re-
randomizes code only when suspicious activity is detected.
MARDU considers any probing on code memory and program
crash as suspicious activity and efficiently detects it using
eXecute-Only-Memory (XoM). This design is advantageous
because MARDU needs neither per-process background threads
nor re-randomization interval unlike prior re-randomization ap-
proaches. Particularly, MARDU re-randomization is performed
in the context of a crashing process, thereby not affecting the
performance of other normal running processes.
Performance: Immutable code pointers. The above de-
scribed design decisions for scalability also help reduce per-
formance overhead. In addition, MARDU neither tracks nor
encrypts code pointers so it does not mutate code pointers
upon re-randomization. While this design choice minimizes
performance overhead, other security features (e.g., XoM,
trampoline, and shadow stack) in MARDU ensure the com-
prehensive ROP defense.
Security: Detecting suspicious activities. MARDU considers
any process crash or code probing attempt as a suspicious
activity. MARDU’s use of XoM makes any code probing at-
tempt trigger process crash and system-wide re-randomization.
Therefore, MARDU counters direct memory disclosure attacks
as well as code inference attacks requiring initial code prob-
ing [69], [76]. To implement XoM, we use Intel MPK [50] so
our XoM design does not impose any runtime overhead unlike
virtualization-based designs.
Security: Preventing code & code pointer leakage. In ad-
dition to system-wide re-randomization, MARDU is designed
to minimize the leakage of code and code pointers. Besides
XoM, we use three techniques. First, MARDU applications
always go through a trampoline region to enter into or return
from a function. Thus, only trampoline addresses are stored
in memory (e.g., stack and heap) while non-trampoline code
pointers remain hidden. MARDU does not randomize where
the trampoline region is so MARDU does not need to track
and patch code pointers in memory upon re-randomization.
Second, MARDU performs fine-grained function-level random-
ization within an executable (e.g., libc.so) to completely
disconnect any correlation between trampoline addresses and
code addresses. This provides high entropy (i.e., roughly n!
where n is the number of functions), so it is not feasible
to succeed BROP [26] without any crash. Also, unlike re-
randomization approaches that rely on shifting code base
addresses [25], [29], [61], MARDU is not susceptible to
code pointer offsetting attack (A4). Finally, MARDU stores
return addresses–precisely, trampoline addresses for return–in
a shadow stack; the shadow stack stores only return addresses
and is hidden under a segmentation register in x86. This design
makes stack pivoting practically infeasible.
Design overview. As shown in Figure 1, MARDU is composed
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of compiler and kernel components. The MARDU compiler
replaces call and ret instructions with functionally equivalent
jmp’s to the trampoline region and generates code to store
return addresses in a shadow stack. MARDU compiler gener-
ates PC-relative code so randomized code can be shared by
multiple processes. Also, the compiler generates and attaches
additional metadata to binaries for efficient patching of PC-
relative addressing code upon (re-)randomization. The com-
piler separates data from code pages to prevent false-positive
XoM violations, from MARDU applications attempting to read
inter-mixed data in protected code regions.
The MARDU kernel is responsible for choreographing the
runtime when a MARDU executable is launched. The kernel
extracts and loads the executable’s compiler-generated meta-
data into a cache to be shared by multiple processes. This data
is then used by MARDU for first load-time randomization as
well as re-randomization. The randomized code is cached and
shared by multiple processes; while allowing sharing, each
process will get a different random virtual address space for
the shared code. MARDU kernel prevents read operations of
the code region including the trampoline region using XoM
so trampoline addresses do not leak information about non-
trampoline code. Whenever a process crashes (e.g., XoM
violation), MARDU kernel re-randomizes all associated shared
code so all relevant processes are re-randomized to thwart an
attacker’s knowledge immediately.
B. MARDU Compiler
MARDU compiler generates a binary able to 1) hide its code
pointers, 2) share its randomized code among processes, and
3) run under XoM. To this end, MARDU uses its own calling
convention using a trampoline region and shadow stack.
1) Code Pointer Hiding: Trampoline. MARDU hides
code pointers without paying for costly runtime code pointer
tracking. The key idea for enabling this is to split a binary
into two regions in process memory: trampoline and code
regions (as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3). A trampoline
is an intermediary call site that moves control flow securely
to/from a function body, protecting the XoM hidden code
region. There are two kinds of trampolines: call and return
trampolines. As their names imply, a call trampoline is respon-
sible for forwarding control flow from an instrumented call
to the code region function entry, while a return trampoline
is responsible for returning control flow semantically to the
caller. Each function has one call trampoline to its function
entry, and each call site has one return trampoline returning
to the following instruction of the caller. Since trampolines
are stationary, MARDU does not need to track code pointers
upon re-randomization because only stationary call trampoline
addresses are exposed to memory.
Shadow stack. Unlike the x86 calling convention using
call/ret to store return addresses on the stack, MARDU
instead stores all return addresses in a shadow stack and leaves
data destined for the regular stack untouched. Effectively, this
protects all backward-edges. An instrumented call pushes
a return trampoline address to the shadow stack and then
Fig. 2: Illustrative example executing a MARDU-compiled function
foo(), which calls a function bar() and then returns.
jumps to a call trampoline; an instrumented ret directly jumps
to the return trampoline address at the current top of the
shadow stack. The base address of the MARDU shadow stack
is randomized by ASLR and is hidden in segment register
%gs, which cannot be modified in userspace and will never
be stored in memory. Therefore, it is infeasible to know the
shadow stack base address without causing a program crash.
We additionally reserve one register, %rbp, to use exclusively
as a stack top index of a shadow stack in order to avoid costly
memory access.
Running example. Figure 2 is an example of executing
a MARDU-compiled function foo(), which calls a function
bar() and then returns. Every function call and return goes
through trampoline code which stores the return address to
a shadow stack, of which base address is hidden in register
%gs. The body of foo() is entered via its call trampoline
1 . Before foo() calls bar(), the return trampoline address
is stored to the shadow stack–each call site has one return
trampoline returning to the next instruction of the call site.
Control flow then jumps to bar()’s trampoline 2 , which will
jump to the function body of bar() 3 . bar() returns to the
address in the top of the shadow stack, which is the return
trampoline address 4 . Finally, the return trampoline returns
to the instruction following the call in foo() 5 .
2) Enabling Code Sharing among Processes: PC-relative
addressing. To enable sharing, MARDU compiler generates
PC-relative (i.e., position-independent) code so code can be
shared amongst processes that load the same code in different
virtual addresses. The key challenge here is how to incorporate
PC-relative addressing with randomization. MARDU randomly
places code (at function granularity) while trampoline regions
are stationary. This means any code using PC-relative address-
ing must be correspondingly fixed up once its randomized
location is decided. In Figure 2, all jump targets between
the trampoline and code, denoted in yellow rectangles, are
PC-relative and must be fixed. Also, all data addressing
instructions are PC-relative (e.g., accessing global data, GOT,
etc.) and also must be fixed.
Fixup information for patching. With this policy, it is
necessary to keep track of these instructions to patch them
properly during runtime. To make the runtime patching process
simple and efficient, MARDU compiler generates additional
metadata into the binary that describes exact locations for
patching and their file-relative offset. This fixup information
makes the patching as simple as just adjusting PC-relative
offsets for given locations within analyzing instructions (see
Figure 3). Since displacement in PC-relative addressing is 32
bits in size in x86-64 architecture, ±2 GB is the maximum
offset from the %rip supported by this addressing mode. We
elaborate on the patching process in §IV-C2.
Supporting a shared library. A call to a shared library is
treated the same as a normal function call to preserve the
code pointer hiding property; that is, MARDU refers to the call
trampoline for the shared library call via PLT/GOT. It first calls
the PLT (Procedure Linkage Table) via a trampoline, which
jumps to an external function whose address is not known at
link time and left to be resolved by the dynamic linker. The
result of dynamic symbol resolution is a function address in
the call trampoline of the external library, and it is stored in a
GOT (Global Offset Table) for caching. While MARDU does
not specifically protect GOT, we assume that GOT is already
protected using MPK [36], [62].
Overhead of sharing. MARDU’s sharing mechanism does
not have noticeable runtime overhead as PC-relative code is
already mandatory to enable ASLR. In addition, the overhead
of runtime patching is negligible because MARDU avoids
“stopping the world” when patching the code to maintain
internal consistency compared to other approaches.
3) Enabling Execute-Only-Memory: Finally, to run code
with XoM, MARDU compiler ensures code and data are seg-
regated in different pages. Compilers sometimes intermingle
data within .text code section as an optimization. However,
if this data is attempted to be read during runtime, an XoM
violation will be raised. As previous work [32] reported, we
found that Clang intermingles code and data only for jump
tables so we disable generating jump tables in .text section.
C. MARDU Kernel
MARDU kernel randomizes code at load-time and runtime.
It maps already-randomized code, if it exists, to the address
space of a newly fork-ed process. When an application
crashes, MARDU re-randomizes all mapped binaries associated
with the crashing process and reclaims the previous random-
ized code from the cache after all processes are moved to a
newly re-randomized code. MARDU prevents direct reading
of randomized code from userspace using XoM. MARDU
initializes a shadow stack whenever clone-ing a task1.
1In this paper, a term task denotes both process and thread as the convention
in Linux kernel.
Fig. 3: Memory layout of two MARDU processes: websrv (top
left) and dbsrv (top right). The randomized code in kernel
(0xffffffff811f7000) is shared by multiple processes, which is
mapped to its own virtual base address (0x7fa67841a000 for websrv
and 0x7f2bedffc000 for dbsrv).
1) Process Memory Layout: Figure 3 illustrates the memory
layout of two MARDU processes, websrv (top left) and dbsrv
(top right). MARDU compiler generates a PC-relative binary
with trampoline code and fixup information 1 . When the
binary is first loaded to be mapped to a process, MARDU
kernel first extracts all MARDU metadata–described in §IV-B2–
in the binary and associates it on a per-file basis with the
binary’s inode structure. After extracting metadata, MARDU
has the information it needs to perform load-time randomiza-
tion 2 . Note that load-time randomization and run-time re-
randomization follow the exact same procedure. MARDU first
generates a random offset to set apart the code and trampoline
regions and then places functions in a random order (i.e., a
random permutation) within the code region. Once functions
are placed, MARDU then uses the cached MARDU metadata to
perform patching of offsets within both trampoline and code
regions, updating PC-relative jmp targets and data locations to
preserve program semantics. Finally, the randomized code is
now semantically correct and can be cached and mapped to
multiple applications 3 .
2) Fine-Grain Code Randomization: Allocating a virtual
code region. MARDU kernel randomizes the binary when
the binary is mapped with executable permissions. For each
randomized binary, the MARDU kernel allocates a 2 GB
virtual address region2 (Figure 3 2 ), which will be mapped
to userspace virtual address space with coarse-grained ASLR
(Figure 3 3 )3. MARDU kernel positions the trampoline code
at the end of the virtual address region and returns the start
address of the trampoline as a result of mmap. The trampoline
address will remain static throughout program execution even
after re-randomization.
Randomizing the code within the virtual region. To achieve
2 We note that, for the unused region, we map all those virtual addresses
to a single abort page that generate a crash when accessed to not to waste
real physical memory and also detect potential attack attempts.
3We choose 2 GB because in x86-64 architecture PC-relative addressing
can refer ±2 GB range from %rip.
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a high entropy, MARDU kernel uses fine-grained randomiza-
tion within the allocated virtual address region. Once the
trampoline is positioned, MARDU kernel randomly places the
non-trampoline code within the virtual address region (sized
2 GB); MARDU decides the random offset between the code
and the trampoline regions. Once the code region is decided,
MARDU permutes functions within the code region to further
increase entropy. As a result, trampoline addresses do not
leak information on non-trampoline code and an adversary
cannot infer any actual codes’ location from the system
information, /proc/<pid>/maps, as they will get the same
mapping information for the entire 2 GB region.
Patching the randomized code. After permuting functions,
MARDU kernel patches instructions accessing code or data
according to randomization. MARDU kernel patches %rip-
relative offsets in instructions. This patching process is trivial
at runtime; MARDU compiler generates fixup location informa-
tion in the binary and MARDU kernel re-calculates and patches
PC-relative offsets of instructions according to the randomized
function location. Note that patching includes control flow
transfer between the trampoline and non-trampoline code and
global data access (i.e., .data, .bss) as well as function calls
to other shared libraries (i.e., PLT/GOT).
3) Randomized Code Cache: MARDU kernel manages a
cache of randomized code. When a userspace process tries to
map a file with executable permissions, MARDU kernel first
looks up whether there exists a randomized code of the file
in cache. If cache hits, MARDU kernel maps the randomized
code region to the virtual address of the requested process.
Upon cache miss, it performs load-time randomization as
described earlier. MARDU kernel manages how many times
the randomized code region is mapped to userspace. If the
reference counter is zero and the memory pressure of the
system is high, MARDU kernel evicts the randomized code.
Thus, in normal cases without re-randomization, MARDU
randomizes a binary file only once. In our implementation,
the randomized code cache is associated with the inode cache.
Thus, when the inode is evicted from the inode cache under
severe memory pressure, its associated randomized code is
also evicted.
4) Execute-Only Memory (XoM): We designed XoM based
on Intel MPK [50]4. With MPK, each page is assigned to
one of 16 domains (referred to as a protection key), which is
encoded in a page table entry. Read and write permissions of
each domain can be independently controlled through an MPK
register. When randomized code is mapped to a userspace
virtual address, we set the permissions of the corresponding
page table entries to executable, which is in fact executable
and readable, and assign code memory to the XoM domain.
MARDU kernel configures the XoM domain to non-accessible
(i.e., neither readable nor writable) so MARDU kernel can
enforce execute-only permission with MPK. If an adversary
tries to read XoM-protected code memory, MARDU kernel
4As of this writing, Intel Xeon Scalable Processors [51] and Amazon
EC2 C5 instance [17] support MPK. Other than the x86 architecture, ARM
AArch64 architecture also supports execute-only memory [19].
will raise SIGBUS and trigger re-randomization. Unlike EPT-
based XoM designs [32], [78], our MPK-based design does
not impose runtime overhead.
5) On-Demand Re-randomization: Triggering re-
randomization. An unsuccessful probing of the attack
causes the process to crash. Therefore, when a process crashes
MARDU triggers re-randomization of all binaries mapped to
the crashing process. Since MARDU re-randomization thwarts
attacker’s knowledge (i.e., each attempt is an independent
trial), an adversary must succeed in her first try without
crashing, which is practically infeasible.
Re-randomizing code. Upon re-randomization, MARDU ker-
nel first populates another copy of the code (e.g., libc.so)
in the code cache and freshly randomizes it (Figure 4 1 ).
MARDU places the trampoline code at the same location not to
change trampoline addresses to avoid mutating code pointers
but it randomly places the non-trampoline code (i.e., random
offset in Figure 3 2 ) such that the new one does not overlap
with the old one. Then, it permutes functions in the code.
Thus, the re-randomized code is completely different from the
previous one without changing trampoline addresses.
Live thread migration without stopping the world. The
re-randomized code prepared in the previous step is not yet
visible to userspace processes because it is not yet mapped to
userspace virtual address space. To make it visible, MARDU
first maps the new non-trampoline code to application’s virtual
address space, Figure 4 2 . Because the old trampoline code is
still mapped, the new code is not reachable yet. Then, MARDU
remaps the virtual address range of the trampoline code to the
new trampoline code by updating corresponding page table
entries 3 . After this, the new trampoline code will transfer
control flow to the new non-trampoline code so that any thread
crossing the trampoline migrates to the new non-trampoline
code without stopping the world.
Safely reclaiming the old code. MARDU can safely reclaim
the code only after all threads migrates to the new code 4 .
MARDU uses reference counting for each randomized code to
check if there is a thread accessing the old code. After the
new trampoline code is mapped 3 , MARDU sets a reference
counter of the old code to the number of all runnable tasks 5
that map the old code. It is not necessary to wait for migration
of non-runnable, sleeping task because it will correctly migrate
to the newest randomized code region when it passes through
the (virtually) static return trampoline, which refers to the new
layout when it wakes up. The reference counter is decremented
when a runnable task enters into MARDU kernel due to system
call or preemption. When calling a system call, MARDU kernel
will decrement reference counters of all code that needs to be
reclaimed. When the task returns to userspace, it will return to
the return trampoline and the return trampoline will transfer
to the new code. When a task is preempted out, it may be
in the middle of executing the old non-trampoline code. Thus,
MARDU kernel not only decrements reference counters but
also translates %rip of the task to the corresponding address in
5A task in a TASK_RUNNING status in Linux kernel.
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Fig. 4: Re-randomization procedure in MARDU. Once a new re-randomized code is populated 1 , MARDU kernel maps new code and
trampoline in order 2 , 3 . This makes threads crossing the new trampoline migrate to the newly re-randomized code. After it is guaranteed
that all threads are migrated to the new code, MARDU reclaims the old code 4 . Unlike previous continuous per-process re-randomization
approaches, our re-randomization is time-bound, almost zero overhead, and system-wide.
the new code. Since MARDU permutes at function granularity,
%rip translation is merely adding an offset between the old
and new function locations.
Summary. Our re-randomization scheme has three nice prop-
erties: time boundness of re-randomization, almost zero over-
head of running process, and system-wide re-randomization.
The re-randomization is guaranteed to finish at most within
one scheduling quantum (e.g., 1 msec) once the newly random-
ized code is exposed 3 . That is because MARDU migrates
runnable tasks at system call and scheduling boundary. If
another process crashes in the middle of re-randomization,
MARDU will not trigger another re-randomization until the
current randomization finishes. However, as soon as the new
randomized code is populated 1 , a new process will map
the new code immediately. Therefore, the old code cannot be
observed more than once. MARDU kernel populates a new
randomized code in the context of a crashing process. All other
runnable tasks only additionally perform reference counting
or translation of %rip to the new code. Thus, its runtime
overhead for runnable tasks is negligible. To the best of our
knowledge, MARDU is the first system to perform system-wide
re-randomization allowing code sharing.
6) Shadow Stack: To hide the shadow stack location,
MARDU first reserves a 2 GB of virtual memory space with
abort pages and then chooses a base address to map the
shadow stack. Additionally, no direct reference to the shadow
stack is available in memory because MARDU accesses it
via a dedicated register, %gs, which will not disclose the
base address of the shadow stack. As a result, an adversary
must brute-forcingly guess its base address; any crash in such
attempt will trigger re-randomization, which invalidates all
prior information gained. When a new task is created (clone),
the MARDU kernel allocates a new shadow stack and copies
parent’s shadow stack to its child.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented MARDU on the Linux x86-64 platform.
MARDU compiler is implemented using LLVM 6.0.0 and
MARDU kernel is implemented based on Linux kernel 4.17.0
modifying 3549 and 4009 lines of code (LOC), respectively.
We used musl libc 1.1.20 [13], which is a fast, lightweight C
standard library implementation for Linux, because glibc can-
not be compiled with Clang. We manually modified 164 LOC
in musl libc to make assembly functions (e.g., math functions
and atomic intrinsics) follow the MARDU calling convention
by adding C wrapper functions so MARDU compiler can
automatically identify and instrument them.
A. MARDU Compiler
Trampoline. MARDU compiler is implemented as backend
target-ISA (x86) specific MachineFunctionPass. This pass
instruments each function body as described in §IV-B.
Re-randomizable code. To force all instructions to use
PC-relative addressing, MARDU compiler uses -fPIC. As
an optimization of our trampoline design, MARDU compiler
uses a register %rbp for stack top index of a shadow stack.
To force the compiler to relinquish the use of the register
%rbp, MARDU compiler uses -fomit-frame-pointer. To save
space in PC-relative addressing of code and data, the x86
architecture provides various jmp instruction variants varying
in offset size from 1, 2, or 4 bytes. In MARDU, to maximize
entropy and be able to use the full span of memory within
our declared 2 GB virtual address region, MARDU compiler
uses -mrelax-all to force the compiler to always emit full
4-byte displacement in the executable. Since all PC-relative
instructions have 4-byte wide displacement, MARDU kernel
can freely place any function to within 2 GB address range
without any restriction. To completely separate code and data
for XoM, MARDU compiler disables jump tables in .text
section using -fno-jump-tables.
B. MARDU Kernel
Shadow stack. Currently the maximum shadow stack size
is set to 64 KB; when a task is created, MARDU kernel
creates a 2 GB virtual address space region and randomly
place its shadow stack in that region, guarded by inaccessible
pages (to hide the shadow stack). To maximize performance,
MARDU implements a compact shadow stack without compar-
isons [28].
Secure random number generation. To perform randomiza-
tion, MARDU uses cryptographically secure random number
generator in Linux kernel based on hardware random sources
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such as rdrand/rdseed instructions in modern Intel architec-
tures.
C. Limitation of Our Prototype
Assembly Code. MARDU does not support inline assembly
as it difficult to figure how to deal with module-level inline
assembly as was present in musl libc; however, this could be
resolved with further engineering. Instead, we manually added
C wrapper functions so MARDU compiler adds trampolines
which complies to MARDU calling convention.
Setjmp and exception handling. MARDU uses a shadow
stack to store return addresses. Thus, functions such as setjmp,
longjmp, and libunwind that directly manipulate return ad-
dresses on stack are not supported by our current prototype.
However, modifying these functions is straightforward because
essentially our shadow stack is a variant of compact, register-
based shadow stack [28].
C++ support. Our prototype does not support C++ applica-
tions since we do not have a stable standard C++ library that
is musl-compatible. Therefore handling C++ exceptions and
protecting vtables is out of scope.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate MARDU by answering these questions:
• How secure is MARDU, when presented against current
known attacks on randomization? (§VI-A)
• How much performance overhead does MARDU impose,
particularly for compute-intensive benchmarks? (§VI-B)
• How scalable is MARDU in a real-world network facing
server, particularly with concurrent processes, in terms
of load time, re-randomization time, and memory used?
(§VI-C)
Applications. We evaluate the performance overhead and
scalability of MARDU using SPEC CPU2006 and NGINX
web server. The SPEC benchmark suite has various realistic
compute-intensive applications (e.g., gcc) which are ideal to
see the worst-case performance overhead of MARDU. We
tested all 12 C language benchmarks; we excluded C++
benchmarks as our current prototype does not support it.
We choose SPEC CPU2006 over its newer version, SPEC
CPU2017, because SPEC CPU2006 has been popularly used
to show the performance overhead in many prior works. Input
size ref was used for all benchmarks. To test performance and
scalability of MARDU on a complex, real-world application,
we ran NGINX, which is a widely utilized web server. We
configured NGINX as multi-process. We report the average of
four runs.
Experimental setup. All programs are compiled with op-
timization -O2 and run on a 24-core (48-hardware threads)
machine equipped with two Intel Xeon Silver 4116 CPUs
(2.10 GHz) and 128 GB DRAM.
A. Security Evaluation
To evaluate the security of MARDU, we first analyze the
resiliency of MARDU against existing attacker models against
load-time randomization (A1–A2, §VI-A1) and continuous
re-randomization (A3–A4, §VI-A2). Then, to illustrate the
effectiveness of MARDU for a wider class of code-reuse
attacks beyond ROP, we present results of the residual attack
surface analysis using the threat model of NEWTON [82]
(§VI-A3).
MARDU Security Summary:
• vs.A1: Execute-only memory blocks the attack.
• vs.A2: Re-randomization blocks any code inference via crash.
• vs.A3: Execute-only memory and a large search space (2 GB
dummy mappings) block JIT-ROP and crash-resistant prob-
ing.
• vs.A4: Trampolines decouple function entry from function
bodies blocking any type of code pointer offsetting; full
function code reuse of exported functions remains possible.
• vs.NEWTON: the same as A4.
1) Attacks against Load-Time Randomization: Against JIT-
ROP attacks (A1). MARDU asserts permissions for all code
areas (both code and trampoline regions) as execute-only (via
XoM); thereby, an attacker with JIT-ROP capability cannot
read code contents directly.
Against code inference attacks (A2). MARDU blocks code
inference attacks, including BROP [26], clone-probing [61],
and destructive code read attacks [69], [76] via layout re-
randomization triggered by an application crash or XoM
violation. This mechanism effectively blocks A2 attacks by
preventing attackers from accumulating indirect information
because every re-randomization renders all previously gathered
(if any) information regarding the code layout invalid.
Hiding shadow stack. Attackers with arbitrary read/write
capability (A1/A2) may attempt to leak/alter shadow stack
contents if its address is known. Although the location of
the shadow stack is hidden behind the %gs register to prevent
leakage of pointers, attackers may employ attacks that under-
mine this sparse-memory based information hiding [35], [44],
[66]. To prevent such attacks, MARDU reserves a 2 GB virtual
memory space for the shadow stack (the same way MARDU
allocates code/library space) and then chooses a random offset
to map the shadow stack; other pages in the remaining 2 GB
space are mapped as an abort page that has no permissions.
Even assuming if an attacker is able to identify the 2 GB
region for the shadow stack using crash-less poking [44] or
employing allocation oracles [66], they must also overcome
the randomization entropy of the offset to get a valid address
within this region; any incorrect probe will generate crash (due
to abort pages), thereby, thwarting the attack. Consequently,
the probability of successfully guessing the location of any
valid shadow stack address is roughly one in 231, practically
infeasible.
Entropy. MARDU applies both function-level permutation and
random start offset to provide high entropy to the new code
layout. Specifically, MARDU permutes all functions in each
executable and applies a random start offset to the code area
in 2 GB space for each randomization. Thus, randomization
entropy depends on the number of functions in the executable
and the size of a code region (i.e., log2(n! · 2
31) where n
is the number of functions). To give an idea of how much
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Benchmark
Return address ROP gadget Func reuse MARDU
# call # i-call # gadgets # fn entry reduction (%)
perlbench 13963 272 34371 1668 48606/50274 (96.7%)
bzip2 277 56 1569 81 1902/1983 (95.9%)
gcc 48096 518 89746 4318 138360/142678 (97.0%)
mcf 77 3 513 33 593/626 (94.7%)
milc 2104 7 3864 244 5975/6219 (96.1%)
gobmk 9521 48 37999 2477 47568/50045 (95.0%)
hmmer 4237 12 9466 478 13715/14193 (96.6%)
sjeng 1054 4 3110 139 4168/4307 (96.8%)
libquantum 469 3 1686 107 2158/2265 (95.3%)
h264ref 3118 372 14456 528 17946/18474 (97.1%)
lbm 70 3 394 26 467/493 (94.7%)
sphinx3 2714 11 5628 326 8353/8679 (96.2%)
NGINX 5316 309 15434 1565 21059/22624 (93.1%)
musl libc 4400 77 29743 3722 34220/37942 (90.2%)
Total 95416 1695 247979 15712 345090/360802 (95.6%)
TABLE II: Potential attack surface and MARDU’s reduction in
binaries. While a function call trampoline is a only reusable target
in MARDU, an attacker cannot infer ROP gadgets from the call
trampoline addresses.
entropy MARDU provides, we take an example of 470.lbm in
SPEC CPU2006, a case which provides the minimum entropy
in our evaluation. The program, which contains 26 functions
and is less than 64 KB in size, has 119.38 bits entropy.
Therefore, even for a small program, MARDU randomizes
the code with significantly high entropy (119 bits) to render
attacker’s success rate for guessing the layout negligible.
2) Attacks against Continuous Re-randomization: Against
low-profile attacks (A3). MARDU does not rely on timing
nor system call history for triggering re-randomization. As
a result, neither low-latency attacks nor attacks without in-
volving system calls are effective against MARDU. Instead,
re-randomization is triggered and performed by any MARDU
instrumented application process on the system that encounters
a crash (e.g., XoM violation). Nonetheless, a potential A3
vector could be one that does not cause any crash during
exploitation (e.g., attackers may employ crash-resistant prob-
ing [35], [39], [44], [56], [66]). In this regard, MARDU places
all code in execute-only memory with 2 GB mapped region.
Such a stealth attack could only identify multiples of 2 GB
code regions and will fail to leak any fine-grained layout of
code or code addresses stored in trampolines.
Against code pointer offsetting attacks (A4). For code
pointers referring to call trampolines, attackers may attempt
to launch an A4 attack by adding/subtracting an offset to the
pointer. To defend against such an attack, MARDU decouples
any correlation between trampoline function entry addresses
and function body addresses (i.e., no fixed offset), so attackers
cannot refer to the middle of a function for a ROP gadget
without actually obtaining a valid function body address.
Additionally, the trampoline region is also protected with
XoM, thus attackers cannot probe it to obtain function body
addresses to launch A4. MARDU limits available code-reuse
targets to only exported functions in the trampoline region. We
analyze the residual attack surface of MARDU in Table II.
3) Viable Attacks in MARDU: Attack analysis with NEW-
TON. To measure the boundary of viable attacks against
MARDU, we present a security analysis of MARDU based on
the threat model set by NEWTON [82]. In this regard, we
analyze possible writable pointers that can change the control
flow of a program (write constraints) as well as possible
available gadgets in MARDU (target constraints), which will
reveal what attackers can do under this threat model. In short,
MARDU allows only the reuse of exported functions via call
trampolines.
For write constraints, attackers cannot overwrite real code
addresses such as return addresses and code addresses in the
trampoline. MARDU only allows attackers to overwrite other
types of pointer memory, e.g., object pointers and pointers to
the call trampoline. For target constraints, attackers can reuse
only the exported functions via call trampoline. Note that a
function pointer is a reusable target in any re-randomization
techniques using immutable code pointers [29], [84], [88].
Although MARDU allows attackers to reuse function pointers
in accessible memory (e.g., a function pointer in a structure),
such live addresses will never include real code addresses, such
as a return address or real code address, and will be limited
to addresses referencing call trampolines. Under these write
and target constraints, inferring the location of ROP gadgets
from code pointers (e.g., leaking code addresses or adding an
offset) is not possible.
Residual attack surface. Table II presents potential code-
reuse attack surface of programs in this evaluation and how
much MARDU reduces such attack surface (i.e., possible code
reuse targets in the program). For each program, we present
the attack surface in three categories.
• Direct calls (# call) and indirect calls (# i-call), which
may leak return addresses to the regular stack.
• ROP Gadgets (# gadgets), the main ingredient in construct-
ing a code re-use payload by being chained together to
make a valid attack. This data is obtained via running
ROPgadget [73] on each benchmark binary.
• Function entries (# fn entry) that can be used for whole
function re-use attack.
MARDU completely protects the first two categories (i.e.,
return address and ROP gadget) using shadow stack and XoM,
respectively. Therefore, the remaining potential attack surface
is function entry (i.e., call trampolines in MARDU). Evaluating
SPEC, musl libc, and NGINX, MARDU reduces access to
these sensitive fragments up to a max of 97.1% and 95.6% on
average, constraining attackers to reuse only exported function
entries.
B. Performance Evaluation
Runtime performance overhead with SPEC CPU2006.
Figure 5 shows the relative performance overhead of SPEC
with MARDU compared to the unprotected baseline, compiled
with vanilla Clang. Overall, MARDU’s average overhead is
comparable to the fastest re-randomization systems. Notably,
MARDU worst-case overhead is significantly better than sim-
ilar systems. The average overhead of MARDU is 5.5%, and
the worst-case overhead is 18.3% (perlbench); in comparison
to Shuffler [88] and CodeArmor [29], whose reported average
overheads are 14.9% and 3.2%, respectively, while their worst-
case overhead are 45% and 55%, respectively (see Table I).
This confirms MARDU is capable of matching if not slightly
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Fig. 5: Performance overhead of MARDU for SPEC CPU2006
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Fig. 7: Performance comparison of NGINX web server
improving the performance (especially worst-case) overhead,
while casting a wider net in terms of known attack coverage,
compared to the current state-of-the-art.
Performance overhead breakdown. The two prominent
sources of runtime overhead in MARDU are trampolines and
the shadow stack. To understand how much runtime overhead
each code transformation imposes, we ran SPEC with two
different configurations: we first enabled only trampolines and
do not use a shadow stack (trampoline only in Figure 6),
then we enabled both trampolines and the shadow stack (full
MARDU in Figure 6). The performance overhead of both are
normalized to vanilla SPEC compiled with vanilla Clang. As
Figure 6 shows, the major source of overhead is trampoline;
trampolines incur 5.9% overhead on average, with the worst
cases being 15.8% and 14.2% of overhead, for perlbench
and h264ref, respectively. Note that MARDU’s shadow stack
overhead is negligible. The average difference comparing
MARDU trampolines with full MARDU is less than 0.3%, and
in the noticeable gaps, adding less than 2% to MARDU in
most cases compared to using MARDU trampolines only. This
is expected as MARDU uses a compact shadow stack with-
out comparison epilogue. This implementation performs only
essential bookkeeping to utilize the shadow stack; skipping
unnecessary epilogue micro-optimizations [28].
C. Scalability Evaluation
Runtime performance overhead with NGINX. NGINX is
configured to accommodate a maximum of 1024 connections
per processor, and its performance is observed according
to the number of worker processes. wrk [43] is used to
generate HTTP requests for benchmarking. wrk spawns the
same number of threads as NGINX workers and each wrk
thread sends a request for a 6745-byte static html. To see
the worst-case performance, wrk is run on the same machine
as NGINX to factor out network latency. Figure 7 presents
the performance of NGINX with and without MARDU for
a varying number of worker processes. The performance
observed shows that MARDU exhibits very similar throughput
to vanilla. MARDU incurs 4.4%, 4.8%, and 1.2% throughput
degradation on average, at peak (12 threads), and at saturation
(24 threads), respectively. Note that Shuffler [88] suffers from
the overhead from per-process shuffling thread. Even in their
NGINX experiments with network latency (i.e., running a
benchmarking client on a different machine), Shuffler shows
15-55% slowdown. This verifies MARDU’s design that having
the crashing process perform system-wide re-randomization,
rather than a per-process background thread as in Shuffler,
scales better.
Load-time randomization overhead. We categorize load-
time to cold or warm load-time whether the in-kernel code
cache ( 2 in Figure 3) hits or not. Upon a code cache miss
(i.e., the executable is first loaded in a system), MARDU
performs initial randomization including function-level per-
mutation, start offset randomization of the code layout, and
loading & patching of fixup metadata. As Figure 8 shows, all C
SPEC benchmarks showed negligible overhead averaging 95.9
msec. gcc, being the worst-case, takes 771 msec; it requires the
most overall fixups relative to other benchmarks (see Table III).
For NGINX, we observe that load time is constant (61 msec)
for any number of specified worker processes. Cold load-time
is roughly linear to the number of trampolines in Table III.
Upon a code cache hit, MARDU simply maps the already-
randomized code to a user-process’s virtual address space.
Therefore we found that warm load-time is negligible. Note
that, for a cold load-time of musl libc takes about 52 msec
on average. Even so, this is a one time cost; all subsequent
warm load-time accesses of fetching musl libc takes below
1 µsec, for any program needing it. Thus, load time can be
largely ignored.
Re-randomization latency. Figure 9 presents the time taken
to re-randomize all associated binaries of a crashing process.
The time includes creating re-randomizing the code layout,
and reclaiming the old code ( 1 - 4 in Figure 4). To emulate
an XoM violation, we killed the process with a SIGBUS signal
and measured the re-randomization time inside the kernel. The
average latency of SPEC is 6.2 msec. The difference between
load-time and re-randomization latency because MARDU takes
advantage of the metadata being cached from load-time, this
means no redundant file I/O penalty is incurred, giving this per-
formance gain. To evaluate the efficiency of re-randomization
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on multi-thread/multi-process applications, we measured the
re-randomization latency with varying number of NGINX
worker processes up to 24. We confirm that the latency is
consistent regardless of number of workers (5.8 msec on
average with 0.5 msec of standard deviation).
Re-randomization overhead under active attacks. A good
re-randomization system should exhibit good performance not
only in its idle state but also under stress from active attacks.
To evaluate this, we stress test MARDU under frequent re-
randomization to see how well it can perform, assuming a
scenario that MARDU is under attack. In particular, we mea-
sure the performance of SPEC benchmarks while triggering
frequent re-randomization. We emulate the attack by running
a background application, which continuously crashes at the
given periods: 1 sec, 100 msec, 50 msec, 10 msec, and 1 msec.
SPEC benchmarks and the crashing application are linked with
the MARDU version of musl libc, forcing MARDU to con-
stantly re-randomize musl libc and potentially incur perfor-
mance degradation on other processes using the same shared
library. In this experiment, we choose three representative
benchmarks, milc, sjeng, and gobmk, that MARDU exhibits a
small, medium, and large overhead in an idle state, respectively.
Figure 10 shows that the overhead is consistent, and in fact,
is very close to the performance overhead in the idle state
observed in Figure 5. More specifically, all three benchmarks
differ by less than 0.4% at a 1 sec re-randomization interval.
When we decrease the re-randomization period to 10 msec
and 1 msec, the overhead is quickly saturated. Even at 1 msec
re-randomization frequency, the additional overhead is under
6 %. These results confirm that MARDU provides performant
system-wide re-randomization even under active attack.
Runtime memory savings. While an upfront one-time cost
is paid for instrumenting with MARDU, the savings greatly
outweigh this. To illustrate, we show a typical use case of
MARDU in regards to shared code. musl libc is ≈800 KB
in size, instrumented is 2 MB. Specifically, musl libc has
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Fig. 10: Overhead varying re-randomization frequency
Benchmark
Numbers of Fixups Binary Increase (bytes)
Call Tr. Ret Tr. PC-rel. addr Total Trampolines Metadata Total
perlbench 1596 39174 62430 103200 1115136 2607559 3722695
bzip2 66 926 896 1888 17568 78727 96295
gcc 4015 118617 169067 291699 3074672 6276870 9351542
mcf 23 94 208 325 1824 19056 20880
milc 234 3531 7256 11021 110688 313620 424308
gobmk 2388 22880 41632 66900 726176 3085208 3811384
hmmer 452 5145 9925 15522 139216 574446 713662
sjeng 129 1368 5418 6915 58912 250234 309146
libquantum 97 1659 1424 3180 25952 93222 119174
h264ref 508 5874 14824 21206 278240 714629 992869
lbm 16 75 260 351 1920 16549 18469
sphinx3 308 4958 8010 13276 103920 409814 513734
NGINX 1497 15004 18984 35485 416736 1309708 1726444
musl libc 4400 10009 7594 22003 192153 1238071 1430224
TABLE III: Breakdown of MARDU instrumentation
14K trampolines and 7.6K fixups for PC-relative addressing,
the total trampoline size is 190 KB and the amount of loaded
metadata is 1.2 MB (refer to Table III). Since MARDU supports
code sharing, only one copy of libc is needed for the entire
system. Our experimental setup at idle reported 310 processes
while a typical 2-core consumer laptop at idle reported 263
processes. Therefore a rough estimate of memory savings for
libc that MARDU provides compared to similar instrumenta-
tion that did not support code sharing is over≈526-620 MB of
still usable runtime memory. Furthermore, comparing to time-
based continuous re-randomization techniques such as Shuf-
fler [88] and CodeArmor [29] which almost always maintain
two copies of code, MARDU’s memory saving for libc is ≈1-
1.2 GB. Backes et al. [22] and Ward et al. [85] also highlighted
the code sharing problem in randomization techniques and
reported a similar amount of memory savings by sharing
randomized code. Finally, note that the use of shadow stack
does not increase runtime memory footprint because MARDU
solely relocates return address from the normal stack to the
shadow stack.
VII. DISCUSSION
Applying MARDU to binary programs. Although MARDU
requires access to source code, applying MARDU directly
to binary programs is possible. The job of the MARDU
compiler is to detect all indirect control transfers (call/ret)
and instrument such transfers to utilize trampolines. Such
instrumentation can be done at binary-level if each call/ret
can be precisely detected in a program. Applying MARDU
to non-PC relative binary is challenging; however, position-
independent executables (PIEs), are now the default code
generation mode in gcc-7, which naturally use PC-relative
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addressing. Therefore, MARDU should be practical enough to
adopt with little additional effort.
Full-function reuse attacks. Throughout our analysis, we
show that existing re-randomization techniques that use a
function trampoline or indirection table, i.e., use immutable
(indirect) code pointer across re-randomization, cannot prevent
full-function reuse attacks. This also affects MARDU; although
limited to functions exposed in the trampoline, MARDU cannot
defend against an attacker reusing such exposed functions as
gadgets by leaking code pointers. We believe that this is a
limitation of using immutable code pointers, and one possible
solution to prevent these attacks could be pairing MARDU
together with control-flow-integrity (CFI) [15], [30], [40], [45],
[46], [60], [64], [65], [68], [71], [80], [81], [83], [89], [90]
or code-pointer integrity/separation (CPI/CPS) [58]. MARDU
already provides backward-edge CFI via shadow stack, so
forward-edge CFI can also be leveraged to further reduce
available code-reuse targets. MARDU’s defense is orthogonal
to CFI, so applying both defenses can complement each other
to provide better security. However, completely eliminating
full-function code reuse and data-oriented programming [49]
with low performance overhead and system-wide scalability is
still an open problem.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While current defense techniques are capable of warding
off current known ROP attacks, most designs must inherently
tradeoff well-rounded performance and scalability for their
security guarantees. With this insight, we introduce MARDU, a
novel on-demand system-wide re-randomization technique to
combat code-reuse attacks. MARDU shows pragmatic defense
design is indeed navigatable in the face of the jungle that the
code reuse attack landscape is. MARDU is the first code-reuse
defense capable of code-sharing with re-randomization and
thus allows scalability in an effort to focus on practicality. In
addition, by being able to re-randomize on-demand, MARDU
eliminates both the costly runtime overhead and the integral
component of a threshold associated with continuous re-
randomization. Our evaluation verifies MARDU’s security guar-
antees against known attacker models and adequately quan-
tifies its high-level of entropy. Furthermore, MARDU’s per-
formance evaluation showcases its robustness when deployed
with real-world applications derived from SPEC CPU2006
averaging overhead of 5.5% as well as confirming scalability
in multi-process scenarios with NGINX web server, averaging
only 4.4% degradation.
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